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Abstract
Background: The desire for universal health coverage in developing countries has brought attention to community-
based health insurance (CBHI) schemes in developing countries. The government of Uganda is currently debating policy 
for the national health insurance programme, targeting the integration of existing CBHI schemes into a larger national 
risk pool. However, while enrolment has been largely studied in other countries, it remains a generally under-covered 
issue from a Ugandan perspective. Using a large CBHI scheme, this study, therefore, aims at shedding more light on the 
determinants of households’ decisions to enrol and renew membership in these schemes. 
Methods: We collected household data from 464 households in 14 villages served by a large CBHI scheme in south-
western Uganda. We then estimated logistic and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions to understand the 
determinants of enrolment and renewing membership in CBHI, respectively.
Results: Results revealed that household’s socioeconomic status, husband’s employment in rural casual work (odds 
ratio [OR]: 2.581, CI: 1.104-6.032) and knowledge of health insurance premiums (OR: 17.072, CI: 7.027-41.477) were 
significant predictors of enrolment. Social capital and connectivity, assessed by the number of voluntary groups a 
household belonged to, was also positively associated with CBHI participation (OR: 5.664, CI: 2.927-10.963). More 
positive perceptions on insurance (OR: 2.991, CI: 1.273-7.029), access to information were also associated with enrolment 
and renewing among others. Burial group size and number of burial groups in a village, were all significantly associated 
with increased the likelihood of renewing CBHI. 
Conclusion: While socioeconomic factors remain important predictors of participation in insurance, mechanisms to 
promote inclusion should be devised. Improving the participation of communities can enhance trust in insurance and 
eventual coverage. Moreover, for households already insured, access to correct information and strengthening their 
social network information pathways enhances their chances of renewing. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Household’s socioeconomic welfare is strongly associated with While community-based health insurance (CBHI) enrolment and renewing 
decisions in rural Uganda.
• Social connectivity and access to information also predict household insurance status.
• It is important to consider community perceptions on health insurance to improve trust in insurance, enrolment and renewing.
• Burial groups in rural Uganda can act as critical entry points for formalising health insurance.
Implications for the public
While community-based health insurance (CBHI) is expanding in many developing countries, with the targets of universal health coverage, 
enrolment remains low where programmes are voluntary in nature. Moreover, for those who enrol, dropping out is high. Understanding why 
households enrol and continue to renew their membership is central to achieving higher insurance coverage and ultimately universal coverage. 
Governments interested in reaching rural poor people with health insurance should consider maximising the potential of existing social support and 
informal insurance systems such as burial groups. Our research adds to a small body of literature on health insurance in Uganda and more broadly 
on renewing membership in insurance in developing countries.
Key Messages 
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Background
The 2010 World Health Report suggested that apart from 
the availability and equitable use of resources, reliance on 
direct payments for health was another barrier to universal 
health coverage, leading to increased catastrophic health 
expenditures.1 Xu et al2 estimated that about 150 million 
people faced catastrophic health expenditures and 100 
million people were pushed into poverty annually due to 
catastrophic health payments. Moreover, poor households 
are more likely to borrow and or sell their household 
productive assets when faced with such health payments.3 
To protect households from eminent deprivation due to 
health expenditures and encouraging policies for universal 
health coverage, the World Health Organization (WHO) has 
recognised the role of community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) schemes. In addition to previous pronouncements 
in support of CBHI (such as Resolution 58.33 of the 2005 
World Health Assembly),4 the 2010 WHO has stated that 
countries need “longer-term plans for expanding prepayment 
and incorporating community and micro-insurance into 
the broader pool” including “voluntary schemes, such as 
community health insurance or micro-insurance….”1
The contributions of CBHI schemes to health systems 
financing and broader pathways to universal health coverage 
in developing countries are well-documented.5,6 In detail, 
substantial research has explored questions of enrolment7-9 
and renewing.10 Nonetheless, in Uganda, a country with a long 
history of CBHI, very little is known about these questions, 
especially from a quantitative perspective. Previous work 
has only used qualitative methods, identifying various issues 
such as lack of trust, limited understanding from both policy-
makers and clients, and limited community involvement, 
among the factors inhibiting enrolment.11-13 Only 3 studies try 
to address these questions quantitatively. Biggeri et al14 study 
the feasibility of CBHI in a region without prior experience in 
a willingness to pay exercise. Cecchi et al,15 using a public good 
experiment, study the dynamics of social capital when third-
party – run CBHI is introduced in villages. They reveal that 
social capital suffers when insurance is formalised through 
CBHI schemes. None of these studies directly addresses the 
main questions, why households join and why households 
remain in CBHI schemes. The closest to our study is16 who 
use mixed methods to investigate why rural households 
choose to enrol in insurance over free health services. This 
study is also in a similar area like ours. They find that overall 
poor quality services, drug stock-outs as well as poor human 
resourcing pushed households from free government health 
services while easier access to healthcare, financial protection, 
the perception of the quality of care and the intrinsic benefits 
of mutual assistance attracted individuals to CBHI. Our main 
objective here is to contribute to this body of work by directly 
addressing these questions.
Overall, the literature on enrolment, as elaborated in several 
systematic reviews7-9,17 can be summarised in 2 dimensions. 
Firstly, the legal, institutional and policy environment 
in which insurance operates is important.18-20 Countries 
with stronger laws also have the political will to facilitate 
higher enrolment. However, major bottlenecks to voluntary 
enrolment are associated with households’ socioeconomic 
capacities to demand. Wealthier, better educated7,21 and 
people with positive perceptions about insurance22 and more 
informed individuals10 are more likely to enrol. Moreover, 
specific groups such as women in reproductive age23 and 
children24 face distinct barriers to enrolment in comparison 
to the general population. 
While enrolling in insurance remains of pertinent interest, 
dropping out of insurance is high.25-27 A handful of papers 
have looked into this issue.10,28,29 The other purpose of this 
research is to add to this thin literature. Moreover, for Uganda, 
this analysis is of further policy interest. After many years of 
a slow policy process,30 the government is in the process of 
starting a national health insurance scheme. The scheme will 
aim to build on and integrate existing community insurance 
schemes into a larger risk pool. These results will, therefore, 
feed into the policy process, in a timely fashion, to give a better 
understanding of what influences rural households’ decisions 
to participate and renew participation. 
The Landscape of Health Insurance in Uganda
Uganda does not have any public insurance programme. The 
current health financing policy provides that general health 
services are free at public health facilities.31 Private non-profit 
health facilities receive grants to subsidise services but also 
charge user fees.32,33 However, there has been a long-standing 
process of starting a public health insurance programme.30 
Coverage of private insurance schemes is lean, available 
mainly to urban formal sector employed individuals and 
estimated at only about 460 000 people in 2012.34 CBHI 
is, therefore, the remaining option for rural, informal and 
poor households. Musau35 profiled the first CBHI scheme 
in Uganda, the Kisiizi Hospital CBHI scheme, and since 
then, the schemes have grown to 21 schemes covering over 
140 000 people in 2014.36 The schemes are mainly in central 
and western Uganda, especially in regions that have been 
known to have burial societies which provide informal 
mutual insurance.37 While previous studies have shown a low 
demand for CBHI in Uganda,11,12 recent studies have shown 
increasing interest.14,15 It is understood that in the financial 
year 2018/2019, the revised National Health Insurance Bill 
will be approved into law for the establishment of a national 
health insurance scheme.38
The Kisiizi Hospital Community-Based Health Insurance 
Scheme
The Kisiizi Hospital CBHI scheme is the largest CBHI 
scheme in Uganda, providing insurance coverage to over 
42 000 individuals. Households pay premiums ranging from 
UGX (Uganda Shilling; Uganda currency) 11 000 per person 
for a household of 8-11 members to UGX 28 000 per person 
for a 2-person household. In US dollar terms, at the time of 
data collection in August 2015, this was equivalent to US$3 
for 8-11 member household and US$8 for the 2 person-
households. Accordingly, these premiums were equivalent 
to 1%-2% of the annual income in south-western Uganda 
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in 2015.39 Enrolment in insurance is group based in that 
households that participate organise themselves in groups. 
However, the scheme does not operate as group insurance 
since there is no joint liability in the group. Majority of the 
groups (about 95%) were traditional funeral groups which 
have existed in the area for very many decades.37 However, 
the unit of enrolment is a household and groups are only used 
as marketing and coordination platforms. Currently, about 
210 groups belong to the scheme. Households are required 
to enrol as a full unit and not partial enrolment as observed 
in other schemes such as in Ghana.40 An important feature 
of the scheme is the waiting time for full coverage. Newly 
enrolled households typically wait for about 12 months to 
be fully covered. Newly enrolled members pay 90% of the 
medical costs when they are hospitalised within the first 12 
months of enrolment. This waiting time is significantly longer 
than what is observed in other schemes such as in Nigeria.41 
These conditions are aimed to control moral hazard. The 
scheme covers basic primary care, maternity care, surgeries, 
and outpatient and inpatient services and excludes outpatient 
services for chronic illnesses and substance abuse related 
illnesses and injuries. 
Methods
The Data
Data used in this study comes from a cross-sectional survey 
conducted between August and December 2015, in Kabale 
and Rukungiri districts in south-western Uganda. A multi-
stage simple random sampling criterion was applied to select 
a population representative sample of 464 households in 14 
villages. The first stage was the selection of villages from 3 
sub-counties of Nyakishenyi and Nyarushanje in Rukungiri 
district and Kashambya sub-county in Kabale district, which 
have the highest coverage of Kisiizi CBHI scheme. The 3 
sub-counties represented a population of 106 000 people in 
23 500 households as of the 2014 national census.42 We invited 
leaders from 23 parishes in the 3 sub-counties for a first stage 
sampling workshop. Fifteen of the 23 parish leaders attended 
in person or were represented by a committee member. Eight 
parishes that did not have a representative were excluded. All 
parish leaders were requested to list all the villages in their 
area. In addition, they were requested to classify the villages 
into rich and poor, using access to road, school or health 
facility or market as a criterion. Altogether, 174 villages 
were listed, 104 as poor and 70 as rich villages. All the listed 
villages’ names were put in a raffle box according to their 
categorisation and a leader randomly selected 7 villages from 
each box in the presence of other leaders and the research 
team. Leaders who attended the village sampling workshop 
provided the contacts of lower level leaders in the selected 
villages for household listing. 
The second stage of sampling was household listing and 
selection of households for the survey. Fourteen lower level 
leaders were invited for a household listing workshop and 
requested to generate a list of households in their villages 
who had a child between 6 months and less than 59 months 
(5 years) . A total of 511 households were listed and 464 were 
interviewed. 
A data collection tool was developed by the first and fourth 
authors and was duly assessed by the respective ethical 
committees in Germany and Uganda. The tool included a 
household demographic module collecting data on household 
occupancy; a child and maternal health module recording 
data on healthcare seeking behaviour for mothers and 
children and a nutrition module recording household food 
availability and intake data. Data on durable assets holdings 
and other endowments in agriculture, water and sanitation, 
and housing was recorded as an indicator for household 
social and economic welfare. The health insurance and social 
connectivity modules collected data regarding household 
insurance status, group membership and participation, and 
knowledge of insurance such as premiums and benefits 
package. In line with,22 data on various perceptions on 
insurance were collected. Moreover, village level information 
is also collected and used to control for village heterogeneity. 
Data were collected using Open Data Kit, a computer-
assisted personal interviewing platform. Open Data Kit and 
other platforms of similar fashion are becoming increasingly 
suggested for their overall cost-effectiveness and reducing of 
common survey errors.43 Data analysis was conducted in Stata 
version 14.44
Empirical Approach
We employ 2 models to understand the determinants of 
enrolment and renewing CBHI. Since the outcome for CBHI 
participation (1 if CBHI member and 0 otherwise), the suitable 
model is a binary logistic model to estimate the determinants 
of household’s CBHI status. The model is given as: 
Pr (Insure=1)i = β0+β1X1i+ β2X2i+β3X3i+ϵi
Where the probability that a household i was enrolled 
depends on X1i – a vector of household socioeconomic and 
demographic variables, X2i – a vector of household enabling 
variables and X3i is a vector of village level variables and 
an error term ϵi. All household socioeconomic variables, 
household enabling variables and village level variables are 
shown in Table 1. We show odds ratios of the association 
between the covariates and the decision to enrol in CBHI. 
To ascertain that the model is well fit, we first re-centre some 
variables to overcome multi-collinearity.45 We then show the 
Variance Inflation Factor statistic. 
The decision to renew membership in CBHI is modelled 
in the form of the length of time households are insured. The 
more the years a household was in CBHI implies the number 
of annual renewing decisions taken by the households. As seen 
in the Figure, majority households (56%) are not in CBHI. 
These are therefore coded as zeros regarding the decision the 
renew insurance.
Because the outcome is a non-negative count outcome – 
years of participation in CBHI, a suitable model would be 
of a Poisson distribution, such as Poisson, Tobit, or negative 
binomial model. However, as the Figure shows, we are 
worried about excess zeros (over-dispersion) since more than 
half the sample does not renew participation. To model the 
determinants of renewing CBHI, we, therefore, use a zero-
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inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model. The ZINB model 
facilitates the estimation of a non-negative count outcome 
with possible over-dispersion better than other models for 
count outcomes.46 The ZINB model performs the inflation 
equation and an outcome equation. The inflation equation 
is a logistic estimation of the probability that the outcome is 
observed as a zero. After accounting for the excess zero in the 
model estimates the probability of the outcome.47 In order to 
show that the ZINB is the appropriate model over negative 
binomial model and other models of count outcomes, we 
show the Vuong test, which shows a significantly positive test 
statistic if the data is suitable for zero-inflated models. The 
basic model is then given as follows.
Yearsi = β0+β1X1i+ β2X2i+β3X3i+ϵi
Similar to determinants of CBHI enrolment status, renewing 
(Yearsi) is a function of vectors for household socioeconomic 
and demographic variables, household enabling variables and 
village covariates. In the results, we report incident rate ratios 
(IRRs) for renewing CBHI.
Results
Descriptive Results
Overall, 44% of the respondents were enrolled in CBHI and 
the average number of years of enrolment was 5 years. In 
Table 2, we detail summary statistics and the mean differences 
between CBHI and non-CBHI households, obtained through 
t tests. The average age for under-fives was 30.2 months 
while the average age for mothers was 30.2 years. 55.4% of 
the mothers had delivered their youngest child in a health 
facility. On average, birth weight was 3.1 kilograms but we 
observe substantial differences between CBHI and non-CBHI 
children.
Birth weight was significantly lower in households with 
CBHI than those without. This might raise questions of 
adverse selection into insurance. However, as enrolment 
is group based and groups are independent of individual 
household preferences, it is highly doubted that households 
with low birth weight enrolled more than the rest. We also 
observe substantial differences in parental education and 
religion. CBHI households are more likely to be Catholic, 
which is the dominant religion in the area but are less likely 
to have secondary education. Men in insured households 
are likely to be employed in casual labour while only 5% of 
mothers in CBHI were casual labourers. 
Socioeconomic welfare was assessed using principal 
components analysis (PCA)48 and combined 41 variables 
representing household asset holding, water and sanitation, 
agriculture and livestock assets and housing quality into a 
single index. On average, in terms of socioeconomic welfare, 
households in the richest quintile were almost 3 times better 
off than the poorest (bottom quintile) households. There is 
no substantial difference between the CBHI and non-CBHI 
in the richer households. Only in the poorest households, 
do observe substantial differences between the insured and 
non-insured households. Using PCA again, we follow Jehu-
Appiah et al22 to develop a perception index. The perception 
index combines 42 Likert scale questions (see Supplementary 
file 1, Table S1) that elicit perceptions of 6 dimensions, 
namely; social influence, financial protection, premiums, 
health beliefs, management of schemes, the convenience 
of the scheme processes (such as enrolment requirements) 
and quality of care. A second PCA is then executed on these 
7 indices to generate the first principal component as the 
perception index. To ascertain internal consistency of the 
indices developed, we provide the Cronbach’s alpha for the 
overall perceptions index and the 6 dimensions of perceptions 
in Table S2 in Supplementary file 1. Overall, we observe that 
households in CBHI have more positive perceptions than 
households not in CBHI. 
As stated earlier, CBHI is accessed through burial groups. 
In principle, every household belongs to a burial group. 
Katabarwa37 has stated about their historical presence and 
Musau35 found that over 90% in south-western Uganda 
belonged to one. In this survey, virtually every household 
belonged to a burial group. We find that households in CHBI 
belonged to burial groups with an average of 60 households. 
Households that were not in CBHI were in generally larger 
burial groups averaging 80 households. 
Villages can have several burial groups. We find households 
in CBHI belonged to villages with about 3.6 burial groups 
while non-CBHI belonged to villages with an average of 2.1 
groups. We further indicate the differences in voluntary group 
membership, access to information and neighbourhood 
effects. Overall, households in CBHI belonged to more 
groups, had more access to information and had at least one 
neighbour in CBHI. We provide more descriptive results in 
Table 2.
Empirical Results
Determinants of Enrolment in Community-Based Health 
Insurance Scheme
Table 3 presents the results of a logistic regressions model 
for the determinants of enrolment in CBHI. We present 
the results in 3 models. Model one presents only household 
socioeconomic and demographic variables. Model 2 includes 
household enabling factors. These variables are not in direct 
control of a household but enhance the household’s capacity 
to participate in CBHI. The full model, Model 3 includes 
Figure. Number of Years in CBHI. Abbreviation: CBHI, community-based health 
insurance.
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Table 1. Variable Type and Description
Variable Type and Variable Coding
CBHI enrolment Dummy: 1 = if a household was enrolled in CBHI, 0 = otherwise
Years in CBHI Continuous: number of years in CBHI, ranging from 0 for the uninsured to 11 years 
Child’s age (months) Continuous: age in months
Mother’s age Continuous: age in years
Birth weight Continuous: weight in kilos
Household size Continuous: number of people residing in the household
Parental (secondary) education Dummy: 1 = if at least of the parents has a secondary education, 0 = none of the parents has a secondary education
Food adequacy Dummy: 1 = if household states had enough food, 0 = if household states that food was not enough in the last 7 days
Household diet diversity score Continuous: number of foods groups consumed in the last 7 days out of 12 food groups
Father employment = casual 
labourer
Dummy: 1 = father/husband’s employment is casual labour, 0 = father/husband’s employment not casual labour
Mother employment = casual 
labourer
Dummy: 1 = mother’s employment is casual labour, 0 = mother’s employment not casual labour
Health facility delivery Dummy: 1 = if child delivered from a health facility, 0 = child not delivered in a health facility
Quintile 1 (poorest)
Categorical: divides a social economic wealth index into 5 categories: 1 = quintile 1 – poorest, 2 = quintile 2 – 





Has a neighbour in CBHI
Dummy: 1 = if one of the four immediate neighbours of a household is in CBHI, 0 = none of the neighbours is in 
CBHI
Access to information
Dummy: 1 = if the household had a television, or listened to radio daily or read a newspaper,  0 = household does 
not own a television, read a newspaper or listen to radio daily
Voluntary groups membership Continuous: number of voluntary groups a household belongs/participates in 
Perception index
Continuous: PCA generated index (first principal component) from 7 indices about perceptions on health insurance 
The index is made of 6 individual indices for premiums (5 questions), convenience of CBHI scheme (8 questions), 
benefits/financial protection (7 questions), quality of care (7 questions), management of the scheme (4 questions) 
and health beliefs (4 questions) and social influence (5 questions). Altogether, 42 questions in the index
Village health team 
Dummy: 1 = if respondent has received any health advice from a community health worker in the last 12 months, 0 
= otherwise
Know premiums Dummy: 1 = if respondent knows insurance premiums per individual, 0 = otherwise
Health facility waiting time Continuous: waiting time at health facility recorded in minutes
Size of burial groups Continuous: number of households in a burial group a household belongs to
Number of burial groups in village Continuous: number of burial groups in the village
Village has a school Dummy: 1 = if village has a school, 0 = otherwise
Village has a health centre Dummy: 1 = village has a health centre, 0 = otherwise
Trading trade Dummy: 1 = if village main economic activity is retail trade, 0 = otherwise
Banana cultivating village Dummy: 1 = if village main economic activity is banana cultivation, 0 = otherwise
Distance to health facility Continuous: distance from village to commonly used health facility 
Village altitude Continuous: village altitude measured in metres above sea level
Abbreviations: CBHI, community-based health insurance; PCA, principal components analysis.
village covariates. First, we explore factors associated with 
reducing the odds of enrolment. We observe that households 
with older children are less likely to enrol as their odds of 
enrolment are lower by about 3% (odds ratio [OR]: 0.969, CI: 
0.940-0.999) in the full model. The coefficient of the child’s 
age in months square is not statistically significant, implying 
that, as there is no evidence to suggest that, as children in 
households become older, household enrolment behaviour 
changes. Secondly, we observe that parental education is 
negatively associated with enrolment. Households whose at 
least one parent had a secondary education were less likely 
to enrol, with odds reduced by 60% (OR: 0.401, CI: 0.168-
0.957) in model 2. However, once we control for village level 
covariates, the association though still negative, is no longer 
statistically significant. However, what is consistent in all 
models is the employment status of the women. We find 
that women employment in casual labour was negatively 
associated with enrolment. Odds were low by slightly over 
71% (OR: 0.286, CI: 0.083-0.985). 
We then turn to factors that enhance enrolment of 
households. As would be expected, there is a strong 
correlation between household wealth and enrolment status. 
Holding the poorest households as a comparison group, we 
find that as households improve in wealth, so do their odds of 
enrolment in CBHI. Average, richer and richest households 
were 2 to 4 times more likely to participate in CBHI. Once 
we control for household enabling variables we observed 
that households in average and richest classification were 
3.5 times (OR: 3.533, CI: 1.194-10.455) and four times (OR: 
4.102, CI: 0.948-17.762), respectively more likely to enrol. 
Once we control for additional village determinants, we 
observe that richest households were still close to 4 times 
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(OR: 3.790, CI: 0.847-16.950) more likely to enrol compared 
to the poorest households. These unequal odds of enrolment 
based on socioeconomic welfare point to exclusion of the 
poorest despite the usefulness of existing informal risk-
sharing mechanisms propagated through the burial groups as 
observed in this case study and elsewhere.49,50 Socioeconomic 
exclusion has been observed in studies in Ghana,24 though 
these and our findings here might differ from other studies 
that do not find a significant influence of socioeconomic 
status on enrolment.51
Husbands’ employment in casual work was associated with 
increasing the odds of enrolment by 2 to 3 times. In the full 
model, we observe that the odds of enrolment were higher 
by 2.6 times (OR: 2.581, CI: 1.104-6.032). In addition to the 
husband’s employment type, we also observe that belonging 
to the Catholic religion was associated with increasing the 
odds of participating in CBHI by up to 3.4 times. After the full 
model, we observe that being Catholic was associated with 3 
times (OR: 2.991, CI: 1.273-7.029) more odds of enrolment 
compared to other religions. Regarding information, our 
measure assumes that owning a radio or television or access 
to newspapers frequently correctly measures access to 
information. We find that households with higher access to 
information had higher odds of enrolment (OR: 1.643; 95% 
CI: 1.030-2.620). However, while to coefficient generally 
increases, it is not significant when we control for group level 
enabling factors and village level covariates. 
Model 2 includes several households enabling factors. 
These variables give us a host of social network and social 
connectivity proxies. We find that most of these indeed 
are associated with increased odds of enrolment. First, we 
observe that having a neighbour in CBHI increased odds of 
enrolment by 3.5 times (OR: 3.509, CI: 1.514-8.133). This 
association vanishes when we control for other community 
level variables. We find that belonging for more voluntary 
groups was associated with increasing enrolment by over 5 
times (OR: 5.664, CI: 2.927-10.963). However, the relationship 
is non-linear in that enrolment reduces as a household 
participated in more voluntary groups. We find that what 
households know and what they perceive about insurance 
matters. Knowing premiums is a proxy of knowledge about 
CBHI processes, benefits, requirements and expectations. We 
find that knowing premiums was associated with increasing 
the odds of enrolment by up to between 20 times and 17 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – T Tests With Mean Differences in the Subgroups
Overall Mean Mean Non-CBHI Mean CBHI Mean Difference T Statistic 
Child’s age (months) 30.202 30.822 29.404 1.418 .318
Mother’s age 30.204 30.132 30.296 -0.164 .807
Birth weight 3.157 3.202 3.099 0.103 .026**
Household size 5.679 5.659 5.704 -0.045 .824
Catholic 0.504 0.383 0.660 -0.277 .001***
Parental (secondary) education 0.304 0.356 0.236 0.120 .005***
Food adequacy 0.534 0.510 0.567 -0.057 .224
Household diet diversity score 4.097 4.027 4.187 -0.160 .173
Father employment = casual labourer 0.356 0.299 0.414 -0.115 .010**
Mother employment = casual labourer 0.101 0.138 0.054 0.084 .003**
Health facility delivery 0.554 0.529 0.586 -0.057 .218
Wealth index (poorest) -1.262 -1.291 (64) -1.199 (30) -0.092 .023**
Poorer -0.777 -0.790 (53) -0.759 (40) -0.030 .231
Average -0.299 -0.326 (48) -0.273 (48) -0.052 .077*
Richer 0.310 0.311 (42) 0.309 (53) 0.003 .961
Richest 2.211 2.370 (54) 1.943 (32) 0.427 .187
Access to information 0.599 0.548 0.665 -0.117 .011**
Has a neighbour in CBHI 0.692 0.521 0.911 -0.390 .001***
Voluntary groups membership 1.911 1.516 2.420 -0.904 .001***
Perception index -0.000 -0.546 0.712 -1.247 .001***
Village health team 0.466 0.421 0.522 -0.101 .031**
Know premiums 0.528 0.241 0.897 -0.655 .001***
Health facility waiting time 88.621 71.540 110.581 -39.041 .001***
Size of burial groups 71.366 80.100 60.140 19.962 .001***
Number of burial groups in village 2.778 2.130 3.611 -1.481 .001***
Village has a school 0.528 0.628 0.399 0.229 .001***
Village has a health centre 0.401 0.460 0.325 0.135 .003***
Trading trade 0.366 0.391 0.335 0.056 .217
Banana cultivating village 0.261 0.249 0.276 -0.027 .515
Distance to health facility 11.239 12.646 9.429 3.217 .001***
Village altitude 1720.235 1671.336 1783.105 -111.769 .001***
N 464 261 203
Abbreviation: CBHI, community-based health insurance.
Significance levels for P values for * .10, ** .05, *** .01. For wealth index, the numbers of observations are 94, 92, 97, 95 and 86 for the poorest, poorer, average, 
richer and richest households, respectively. Observations for CBHI and non-CBHI households in parenthesis.
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Results for Determinants of Enrolling in CBHIa
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OR P Value 95 % CI OR P Value 95 % CI OR P Value 95 % CI
Child age (months) 0.997 .653 0.981-1.012 0.973** .041 0.947-0.999 0.969** .040 0.940-0.999
Child age square 1.000 .474 0.999-1.001 1.000 .952 0.998-1.002 1.000 .606 0.998-1.001
Mother’s age 1.009 .665 0.969-1.051 0.999 .980 0.921-1.084 1.045 .367 0.949-1.151
Mother’s age square 1.000 .878 0.996-1.003 0.998 .566 0.993-1.004 0.997 .358 0.991-1.003
Birth weight 0.647* .051 0.418-1.002 0.975 .924 0.573-1.659 0.746 .353 0.402-1.385
Household size 1.060 .363 0.935-1.203 0.978 .817 0.807-1.184 0.914 .456 0.721-1.158
Catholic 3.366*** .001 2.202-5.146 2.784*** .002 1.463-5.298 2.991** .012 1.273-7.029
Parental (secondary) education 0.425*** .001 0.259-0.698 0.401** .040 0.168-0.957 0.544 .223 0.205-1.447
Food adequacy 1.106 .671 0.695-1.759 1.131 .734 0.556-2.299 1.424 .414 0.610-3.324
Household diet diversity score 1.113 .277 0.918-1.349 0.984 .916 0.723-1.338 0.955 .786 0.684-1.333
Husband employment = casual 2.302*** .001 1.410-3.758 3.341*** .003 1.498-7.448 2.581** .029 1.104-6.032
Mother employment = casual 0.281*** .001 0.138-0.574 0.273** .012 0.099-0.749 0.286** .047 0.083-0.985
Health facility delivery 1.342 .182 0.871-2.065 1.138 .718 0.565-2.292 1.097 .808 0.520-2.314
Wealth index (base: poorest)
Poorer 1.371 .354 0.703-2.674 0.847 .748 0.307-2.336 0.742 .611 0.235-2.343
Average 2.075** .043 1.022-4.212 3.533** .023 1.194-10.455 2.615 .111 0.802-8.522
Rich 2.398** .018 1.164-4.943 1.998 .248 0.618-6.463 1.301 .655 0.410-4.126
Richest 1.428 .373 0.652-3.126 4.102* .059 0.948-17.762 3.790* .081 0.847-16.950
Access to information 1.643** .037 1.030-2.620 1.750 .152 0.813-3.768 1.880 .117 0.854-4.138
Has neighbour in CBHI 3.509*** .003 1.514-8.133 1.472 .508 0.468-4.625
Voluntary groups (number) 5.907*** .001 3.197-10.915 5.664*** .001 2.927-10.963
Voluntary groups square 0.528*** .001 0.380-0.734 0.612** .012 0.416-0.899
Perception index 1.295** .033 1.020-1.642 1.263* .086 0.968-1.649
Village health team 1.896* .079 0.929-3.871 1.440 .415 0.600-3.460
Know premiums 20.167*** .001 9.106-44.663 17.072*** .001 7.027-41.477
Waiting time 0.999 .683 0.996-1.003 0.999 .720 0.996-1.003
Burial group size 0.971*** .001 0.957-0.985 0.969*** .003 0.949-0.990
Burial groups in village (number) 1.208 .508 0.691-2.113
Village has school 0.653 .534 0.170-2.504
Village has health centre 1.197 .843 0.202-7.082
Trading village 0.314* .092 0.082-1.208
Banana cultivating village 0.693 .768 0.061-7.910
Distance to health facility 0.826 .248 0.596-1.143
Distance square 1.033 .586 0.918-1.162
Village altitude 1.002 .808 0.989-1.015
Constant 0.185*** .000 0.090-0.378 0.009*** .000 0.002-0.046 0.026** .016 0.001-0.501
Pseudo r-squared 0.147 0.615 0.662
Variance inflation factor 1.92 2.06 3.02
Observations 458 458 458
Abbreviations: CBHI, community-based health insurance; OR, odds ratio.
*** P < .01, ** P < .05, * P < 0.1.
a Outcome variable: CBHI status, 1 if insured, 0 otherwise.
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times in the full model (OR: 17.072, CI: 7.027-41.477). The 
perceptions index reflects how households generally think 
about health insurance in several dimensions. We find that 
holding more positive perceptions were associated with 26% 
to 30% higher odds of enrolment (OR: 1.263, CI: 0.968-
1.649) in Model 3. However, belonging to a large burial group 
reduced enrolment by up to 3% (OR: 0.969, CI; 0.949-0.990). 
Finally, in Model 2, we observe that receiving advice from 
a community health worker was associated with increasing 
the odds of enrolment by close to 90% (OR: 1.896, CI: 0.929-
3.871). However, the influence of community health workers 
reduces when we control for village level covariates in the full 
model.
Determinants of Staying in Community-Based Health Insurance 
Scheme
The second major interest of this paper is to understand 
what influences households to renew participation in CBHI, 
especially in view of high dropouts recorded in similar CBHI 
schemes.25,52 After implementing ZINB models, we show 
results in Table 4, in 3 models for household socioeconomic 
and demographic variables, plus additional household 
enabling factors and the full model includes additional village 
covariates. 
First, we observe that parental age plays an important role 
in renewing decisions. Households with older mothers are 
more likely to renew CBHI by an additional year (IRR: 1.045, 
CI: 1.021-1.069) however; renewing is less likely when as 
mothers get older as shown by the quadratic term of mother’s 
age. We find the households with older children were more 
likely to renew (IRR: 1.007, CI: 1.001-1.012), though the effect 
general reduced when we control for additional enabling and 
village covariates. Like the enrolment decisions, enrolled 
catholic households were more likely to renew CBHI, with an 
incident rate ranging from 45% to 53% (IRR: 1.445, CI: 1.138-
1.837). Regarding socioeconomic status, we observe that 
richer households were more likely to renew membership. 
Controlling for socioeconomic and household enabling 
factors, average, rich and richest households were 1.5 to 1.9 
times more likely to renew membership. Once we controlled 
for additional village covariates, we observed that the richest 
households were 1.6 times more likely to renew (IRR: 1.640, 
CI: 1.050-2.562). 
The battery of enabling factors revealed similar effects on 
renewing as on enrolment. We observe that having a neighbour 
in CBHI was associated with increasing the likelihood of 
renewing CBHI by 2 times (IRR: 1.786, CI: 1.217-2.621) while 
belonging in an additional voluntary group was associated 
with an increased likelihood of renewing by up to 2.3 times 
(IRR: 2.260, CI: 1.835-2.783). However, households reduce 
renewing as they participate in more voluntary groups. 
Like enrolling decisions, households who knew the correct 
premiums levied were about 3 times (IRR: 2.968, CI: 2.090-
4.216) more likely to renew CHBI membership. Belonging 
to a large burial group increased the likelihood of an insured 
household to renew membership by 0.7% (IRR: 1.007, CI: 
1.000-1.014). 
Regarding access to information, we find that households 
with more access to information had a higher likelihood of 
renewing membership, improved by close to 50% (IRR: 1.486; 
95% CI: 1.167-1.892) in the full model. We find that like 
enrolment, households having a woman employed in casual 
labour were less likely to renew. In particular, the likelihood 
is reduced by between 53% and 64% (IRR: 0.641, CI: 0.417-
0.985). 
Many village level variables dampen renewing decisions. 
However, we find the households in villages with more burial 
groups were more likely to renew membership by 36% (IRR: 
1.358, CI: 1.126-1.639). Likewise, residing in a village with a 
school as associated with a higher likelihood of renewing by 
up to 53% (IRR: 1.527, CI: 0.929-2.508). Finally, we highlight 
the influence of distance from health facilities. We find that an 
extra kilometre further from a health facility was associated 
with reducing enrolment likelihood by 29% (IRR: 0.811, CI: 
0.718-0.916) and this association is linearly significant as 
shown by the quadratic term of distance from health facilities.
Effect of Perceptions on Enrolment and Staying Insured 
Because behavioural change is embedded in community social 
structures, perceptions and beliefs are generally influential in 
the adoption of health behaviours. Perceptions about different 
aspects of health insurance generally play an important 
role in how individuals make decisions to enrol and utilise 
services.22,53-56 The perceptions presented here follow the 
classification of Jehu-Appiah and colleagues.22 In particular, 
we explore perceptions regarding management of the scheme, 
financial protection, health beliefs, social influence, the 
convenience of scheme processes, quality of health services 
and premiums. Due to collinearity in the indices, perceptions 
on scheme management and convenience of CBHI processes 
are not included in the regressions. As Jehu-Appiah et al22 have 
also done, we reverse the coding of premiums perceptions. 
Table 5 shows the results of a logistic regression of the 
association of perceptions and enrolment decisions. In 
general, having more positive perceptions was associated 
with increasing the odds of enrolling in CBHI by 57% (OR: 
1.568, CI: 1.390-1.769). Moreover, we were also interested 
in identifying which perceptions were more influential 
in decisions to enrol. All individual perceptions have a 
significant association with enrolment with perceptions on 
health beliefs having a negative association with enrolment 
behaviour (results are available upon request).
Model 2 of Table 5 shows the association of individual 
perceptions and enrolment in a combined model. We observe 
that perceptions regarding the quality of care were associated 
with increasing the odds of enrolment by 15% (OR: 1.151, CI: 
0.986-1.3459). Respondents who believed that the premiums 
were value for money and generally agreed with the ongoing 
premiums policy were more likely to be enrolled, having 
69% higher odds of enrolment (OR: 1.689, CI: 1.402-2.034). 
Finally, we observe that enrolment decisions are not only a 
household choice but also households are influenced by people 
in their networks. We observe that feeling the social influence 
of leaders and relatives was associated with increasing the 
odds of enrolment by 27% (OR: 1.271, CI: 1.110-1.456). This 
finding makes important sense in view of how CBHI in south-
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Table 4. ZINB Results of Determinants of Renewing CBHIa
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IRR P Value 95 % CI IRR P Value 95 % CI IRR P Value 95 % CI
Child age (months) 1.007** .013 1.001-1.012 1.007* .092 0.999-1.014 1.006 .124 0.998-1.014
Child age square 1.000 .718 1.000-1.000 1.000 .677 0.999-1.000 1.000 .888 0.999-1.000
Mother’s age 1.049*** .001 1.032-1.066 1.042*** .001 1.019-1.065 1.045*** .001 1.021-1.069
Mother’s age square 0.997*** .001 0.996-0.998 0.996*** .001 0.994-0.998 0.996*** .001 0.994-0.998
Birth weight 1.067 .434 0.907-1.254 1.144 .235 0.916-1.427 1.103 .404 0.876-1.388
Household size 1.058** .013 1.012-1.106 1.052 .131 0.985-1.125 1.034 .334 0.966-1.106
Catholic 1.134 .116 0.969-1.327 1.532*** .000 1.222-1.921 1.445*** .003 1.138-1.837
Parental (secondary) education 1.010 .916 0.845-1.206 0.845 .218 0.647-1.104 0.878 .331 0.674-1.142
Food adequacy 0.894 .193 0.756-1.058 0.906 .425 0.712-1.154 0.966 .790 0.750-1.244
Household diet diversity score 0.995 .890 0.931-1.064 0.981 .687 0.896-1.075 0.964 .451 0.877-1.060
Husband employment = casual 1.026 .758 0.870-1.210 1.141 .294 0.892-1.461 1.048 .711 0.819-1.340
Mother employment = casual 0.877 .397 0.646-1.189 0.532*** .003 0.351-0.806 0.641** .042 0.417-0.985
Health facility delivery 0.995 .948 0.852-1.161 1.033 .771 0.829-1.288 1.024 .838 0.817-1.284
Wealth index (base: poorest)
Poorer 1.037 .781 0.802-1.341 0.978 .906 0.679-1.409 0.854 .401 0.592-1.233
Average 1.201 .149 0.937-1.539 1.480** .028 1.042-2.101 1.246 .229 0.870-1.785
Rich 1.108 .432 0.858-1.432 1.572** .015 1.094-2.260 1.198 .344 0.824-1.740
Richest 1.199 .222 0.896-1.604 1.948*** .002 1.272-2.983 1.640** .030 1.050-2.562
Access to information 1.062 .473 0.901-1.251 1.336** .019 1.050-1.701 1.486*** .001 1.167-1.892
Has neighbour in CBHI 2.139*** .001 1.435-3.190 1.786*** .003 1.217-2.621
Voluntary groups (number) 2.189*** .001 1.776-2.699 2.260*** .001 1.835-2.783
Voluntary groups square 0.705*** .001 0.630-0.790 0.738*** .001 0.659-0.827
Perception index 0.965 .324 0.900-1.035 0.970 .416 0.902-1.044
Village health team 1.136 .234 0.921-1.401 1.008 .946 0.800-1.270
Know premiums 2.908*** .001 2.043-4.139 2.968*** .001 2.090-4.216
Waiting time 1.000 .708 0.999-1.001 1.000 .701 0.999-1.001
Burial group size 1.002 .396 0.997-1.007 1.007* .066 1.000-1.014
Burial groups in village (number) 1.358*** .001 1.126-1.639
Village has school 1.527* .095 0.929-2.508
Village has a health centre 1.117 .697 0.641-1.945
Trading village 0.347*** .001 0.210-0.574
Banana cultivating village 0.485* .072 0.220-1.068
Distance to a health facility 0.811*** .001 0.718-0.916
Distance square 0.953** .030 0.913-0.995
Village altitude 0.997* .095 0.993-1.001
Constant 4.883*** .000 3.738-6.377 0.415*** .009 0.215-0.799 0.864 .774 0.319-2.340
Vuong (P value) 8.77 (0.001) 3.34 (0.001) 2.98 (0.001)
Observations 458 458 458
Abbreviations: CBHI, community-based health insurance; ZINB, zero-inflated negative binomial; IRR, incident rate ratio.
*** P < .01, ** P < .05, * P < 0.1.
a Outcome variable: number of years in CBHI.
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western Uganda is linked with kin-associated burial groups.37
Furthermore, our analysis is interested in studying how 
perceptions influence decisions to renew CBHI membership. 
We implement a ZINB model due to the nature of our outcome 
– the number of years in CBHI. Results in Model 1 of Table 
6 show that overall perceptions are not significant predictors 
of renewing decision, as seen in the main renewing model 
(in Table 4). More granular analysis of individual perceptions 
indicates that perceptions regarding social influence were 
significant predictors of renewing CBHI membership. In 
particular, respondents who had more influence from other 
people were 8.7% more likely to renew (OR: 1.087, CI: 1.002-
1.178).
The finding regarding other individual and overall 
perceptions might not imply that perceptions do not influence 
decisions of renewing CBHI but could rather indicate that 
once perceptions have been formed and initial enrolment 
decisions have been taken, households are more likely to keep 
in CBHI rather than update their perceptions in a way that 
negatively affects their enrolment status.
Discussion and Policy Implications
The Usefulness of Rural Employment Cash Flows 
We find different effects regarding the employment of men 
and women in casual labour. Non-farm employment, similar 
to casual labour in our study has been integral to rural 
employment and poverty reduction in Uganda.57 However, 
women and men participate in it differently. While only 10% of 
women in our sample were employed in this type of work, close 
to 36% of men were in casually employed. Casual employment 
is essential for village economies because it provides the type 
of cash flow required for burial groups in CBHI. Generally, 
all burial groups in the region and beyond exist to provide 
basic funeral insurance, however, they often go beyond only 
funeral insurance to provide credit services.49,50 Households 
with higher cash flows are therefore able to involve in lending, 
borrowing and saving to accumulate enough for premiums. 
Casual work, with higher cash flow, is appropriate for these 
demands. Moreover, the dynamics of casual work for women 
and men are different. While casual work might favour men 
due to mobility and opportunity to search for employment, 
women’s gender roles might imply that increasing their 
mobility (job search process) and uncertainty of employment 
in addition to traditional gender roles in rural areas can limit 
health utilisation behaviour. For instance, Morgan et al58 
found that women’s workload limits the sustainable utilisation 
of maternal health services.
Presence and Persistence of Socioeconomic Exclusion
The first one is that even in the presence of informal 
insurance systems which are supposedly inclusive,50 poorest 
households are still excluded. Rich households were 4 times 
more likely to enrol and 2 times more likely to renew CBHI 
than their poorest counterparts. The results are of pertinent 
interest to the government of Uganda, which is in the process 
of establishing a national health insurance programme. For 
Table 5. Influence of Perceptions on Enrolment in CBHI
Model 1 Model 2
Variables OR P Value 95% CI OR P Value 95% CI
Overall perceptions index 1.568*** .001 1.390-1.769
Perceptions on quality of care 1.151* .076 0.986-1.345
Perceptions on health beliefs 0.965 .709 0.802-1.162
Perceptions on financial protection 0.955 .429 0.853-1.070
Perceptions on premiums 1.689*** .001 1.402-2.034
Perceptions on social influence 1.271*** .001 1.110-1.456
Constant 0.754*** .005 0.619-0.918 0.747*** .004 0.612-0.911
Observations 464 464
Abbreviations: CBHI, community-based health insurance; OR, odds ratio.
*** P < .01, ** P < .05, * P < 0.1.
Table 6. Influence of Perceptions on Renewing CBHI
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
IRR P Value 95% CI IRR P Value 95% CI
Overall perceptions index 0.995 .863 0.938-1.055
Perceptions on quality of care 0.954 .238 0.882-1.032
Perceptions on health belief 1.048 .353 0.949-1.158
Perceptions on financial protection 0.995 .885 0.936-1.059
Perceptions on premiums 1.076 .156 0.972-1.190
Perceptions on social influence 1.087** .044 1.002-1.178
Constant 5.028*** .000 4.525-5.587 4.790*** .001 4.281-5.359
Observations 464 464
Abbreviations: CBHI, community-based health insurance; IRR, incident rate ratio.
*** P < .01, ** P < .05, * P < 0.1.
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the future of CBHI in particular and the national health 
insurance in general, it is recommended appropriate measures 
for inclusion are taken into consideration in the current 
planning processes. These measures might include premium 
waivers for the poor and progressive premiums for the better-
off households as has been recently introduced in Rwanda.59 
Another possible avenue of including the vulnerable 
population is taking CBHI within the broader spectrum of 
social protection programmes for the poor. In this case, social 
protection instruments such as cash transfers can supplement 
CBHI. Studies in Ethiopia have indicated that combining 
CBHI with other social protection programmes is beneficial 
for both health and socioeconomic outcomes.60 In addition, it 
might be important for development organisations supporting 
health insurance interventions to consider supporting the 
extremely poor households, either at a macro level through 
providing additional funds to insurance programmes61,62 or 
through direct identification and subsidising of the poor.59 
Social Connectivity and Access to Information Enhance 
Membership and Renewing
The influence of household enabling factors is noted. These 
factors are important proxies of social connectivity and social 
learning that takes place in health insurance programmes63 
and other health interventions.64,65 In line with Liu et al,63 our 
findings suggest that households adopt and renew insurance 
through their social networks. An important network 
diffusion point in this study is burial societies in rural areas.66 
Their usefulness in diffusing health information has been 
widely elaborated67,68 and it is our recommendation and CBHI 
promotion programme utilise them even more. Moreover, 
it is even important that the introduction of formal health 
insurance aims to build on existing informal risk management 
mechanism rather than bypass them. Bypassing them might 
erode social capital and eventual failure of the formalisation 
goals.15 
The finding regarding the negative association of large 
burial groups can be explained by relating our case study 
scheme with the wider literature of group behaviour. A 
two-tailed condition for enrolment in this scheme is that 
for smaller burial groups of 30 or fewer households, all 
households are required to enrol while on the other tail, for 
larger burial groups, 60% of the households, which has to 
be higher than 30 households, are required for a group to 
enrol its members. With this condition in mind, the finding 
regarding burial group size aligns with other literature that 
large groups might portray less cooperation and more free-
riding69 but also members might enjoy a higher utility from 
the wider risk-sharing networks,70 which might, in turn, 
reduce the propensity to formalise insurance by enrolling in 
CBHI.
Turning to access to information, we find that access 
to information increases the odds of enrolment as well as 
renewing membership in CBHI. Availability of information 
has been previously studied before in Ghana71 and Burkina 
Faso.72,73 In Burkina Faso, access to information was studied 
through an information, education and communication 
campaign while in Ghana it was studied through listening to 
radio, television or newspapers. Our findings. The findings 
are by and large mixed. The studies in Burkina Faso found 
that while insurance knowledge generally improved through 
access to information, it did not improve enrolment. However, 
the study in Ghana finds that exposure to all either radio or 
television or print media were all associated with increasing 
the odds of enrolment. Our findings are in line with this 
later Ghanaian study. However, while the current studies are 
focused on traditional media, there could be opportunities to 
utilising new types of media such as social media to spread 
information about insurance. Future studies could look into 
this issue. 
Perceptions Are Associated With Enrolment but not Renewing
Regarding the influence of perceptions, the study finds that 
households care about how the CBHI schemes are managed 
and this influences the decisions to enrol. Nevertheless, 
negative perceptions about premiums reduce the likelihood 
of both enrolling and renewing. These findings touch on 
the issue of trust, an underlying cause of failure in most 
CBHI schemes. Earlier work in Uganda found that low 
trust in schemes’ management was a major factor inhibiting 
enrolment. From a policy and implementation dimension, it 
is important to understand and consider how communities 
perceive CBHI. Trust and local buy-in might be achieved for 
instance by promoting more participation. Premiums and 
benefits packages, for instance, could be designed in more 
participatory ways. Understanding the importance of these 
perceptions is important for policy-makers and scheme 
managers in facilitating the development of easily saleable 
insurance interventions and benefits packages. 
Exploring the Potential of Faith-Based Health Providers in 
Insurance Expansion 
Finally, we would like to expound on the finding regarding 
higher enrolment and renewing of Catholic households. 
On average, just about half the households in our sample 
subscribed to the Catholic faith but over 66% of CBHI, 
households were Catholic. We do not have detailed data to 
look into why these households seem to insure more than 
others. However, we believe 2 mechanisms might be explored 
to increase future enrolment. First, larger group association 
through religious gatherings, helps in getting messages 
across to prospective insurance clients. Moreover, individuals 
might be more inclined to absorbing and acting of health 
messages from people of community respect such as religious 
leaders.74,75
Secondly, faith-based associations already play an 
important role in health service delivery in Uganda as well 
as providing health insurance options, especially to rural 
people. The scheme subject to this study is itself run under 
the auspices of the Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau and 
other faith-based medical bureaus run multiple facilities and 
insurance programmes.76 In establishing the national health 
insurance scheme, we recommend that policy-makers utilise 
these faith-based platforms in both marketing the scheme 
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as well as maximising on their wide health infrastructure. 
Studies have shown that faith-based health providers in 
Uganda are intrinsically motivated to serve the poor77,78 hence 
inclusiveness might be achieved through these channels. 
Conclusion
We use a case study of a large CBHI scheme in south-western 
Uganda to shade more light on the reasons for enrolment and 
renewing of CBHI in rural Uganda. After logistic and ZINB 
regressions, we find that wealthier households were more likely 
to enrol in CBHI. Moreover, access to information and better 
social connectivity and husband’s employment in casual rural 
work were positively associated with enrolment decisions. In 
addition, wealthier households, households’ informal social 
support system assessed through membership burial groups 
and number of burial groups in the village was associated 
with renewing CBHI. Knowledge of CBHI assessed through 
knowledge of premiums strongly influenced both enrolment 
and renewing decisions. Moreover, improving perceptions 
about CBHI increases enrolment chances. Overall, by using 
this case study, the paper makes credible contributions to 
quantitatively understanding why households choose to enrol 
and renew in CBHI participation in rural Uganda. This is 
very crucial especially for the ongoing policy debates about a 
national health insurance programme.
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